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SOVIET REACTION TO THE U.S. PIPELINE EMBARGO: THE
IMPACT ON FUTURE SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
THE WEST
I. INTRODUCTION
This note discusses Soviet perceptions of the aborted U.S. sanctions on
Soviet gas pipeline construction imposed in 1981 and 1982. For the reasons
outlined below, it appears that the U.S. sanctions will not adversely affect
Soviet economic relations with Western Europe, at least for the foreseeable
future. The USSR and the West European states have important economic
and political stakes in mutual trade, and, insofar as the U.S. sanctions were
intended to force the West Europeans to sever those ties, the U.S. actions
failed. The anti-Soviet orientation of recent U.S. administrations makes it
unlikely that the USSR will enter into any significant trade agreements
with the United States, absent major concessions by the latter, because the
United States has not renounced the use of sanctions in future dealings with
the USSR. It is possible, however, that the U.S. sanctions may have forced
the Soviet Union to consider restructuring its economic ties with the West,
in order to diminish the impact of possible future actions by Western states.
Such a move would indicate a retrenchment by the Soviets from the policy
of detente, which espoused, inter alia, 'peace-through-trade' but which was
inextricably bound by the political relationships of the participating states.
In a hostile political environment even economically beneficial ties are bro-
ken, Soviet economic analyses notwithstanding. Reagan's sanctions may
have brought this point home to the USSR.
II. DIscussiON
On December 29, 1981, President Reagan declared that American
companies were prohibited from selling to the USSR equipment for the
extraction and transport of oil and gas.' He based his opposition to the
Soviet pipeline construction project initially on Soviet involvement in Po-
land,' but the Reagan administration's reasons expanded to include the use
of prisoner labor on the project8 and the use of hard currency gained by the
1. 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (Jan. 5, 1982). See Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dis-
pute-A compelling Case For the Adoption of Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct 8 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1982, at A14, col. 2. The Soviets had earlier rejected the conten-
tion of the International Association of Human Rights in Bonn that "tens of thousands of
Soviet political prisoners" were working in "inhuman conditions" on the pipeline, asking, rhe-
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sale of gas in Western Europe to modernize the Soviet armed forces.4 On
June 18, 1982, the embargo was extended to similar products of foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. firms and to foreign licensees. This expansion of the
embargo was allegedly effected because the West Europeans had not sup-
ported U.S. initiatives to increase credit restrictions on the Soviet Union.5
The Soviet reaction to the U.S. measures was one of seeming incredu-
lity, as well as professed indignation, particularly in regard to inferences by
the U.S. government that the pipeline deal was sought by the USSR for
ulterior, sinister motives. The Soviets did not deny, of course, that the "gas-
for-pipes" deal was a good business opportunity for them; in fact, the pipe-
line construction project was called the "Project of the Century" in popular
Soviet accounts.' Further, it was openly acknowledged that the construction
of the pipeline using commercial credits on a barter basis allowed the Soviet
Union to divert domestic funds to other national economic programs.7 But
torically, whether the pipeline workers would be responding as enthusiastically to the challenge
of the U.S. sanctions as they were if those workers were political prisoners. Moscow Radio
Broadcast of August 5, 1982, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, DAILY RE-
PORT - SOVIET UNION (hereafter cited as FBIS-SU), Aug. 5, 1982, at CC2.
4. Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1982, at A17, col. 2. In distinguishing between the pipeline sanc-
tions and renewed U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, Reagan asserted that the grain sales
would drain the Soviets' hard currency reserves and thereby diminish the Soviet military po-
tential. This argument was refuted by several prominent U.S. economists and political consul-
tants. See Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1982, at C5, col. 1; Id., Oct. 19, 1982, at C7, col. 1; Id., Oct.
24, 1982, at Fl, col. 3.
5. Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
6. Novoe vremya, Sept. 3, 1982, at 1. Reported in FBIS-SU, Sept. 15, 1982, at CC3. See
also Lukov & Zagorskiy, "Belyy doam protiv 'proekta veka' (The White House versus the
'Project of the Century'), 3 MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA
(hereafter cited M.E.M.O.) 104 (1982).
7. Pravda, June 28, 1982, at 6, reported in FBIS-SU, July 9, 1982, at CC3. Such "bar-
ter" deals, in which financing, equipment and technical expertise are brought in from abroad
and the credits paid off in the products of the enterprises built, are called "compensatory
agreements." Shmelev, "Mirnoe sosushestvovanie i ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo" (Peace-
ful coexistence and economic cooperation), 4 M.E.M.O. 26, 30 (1976). These agreements are
defined by Soviet economists as a form of industrial-economic cooperation existing under con-
ditions of peaceful coexistence, by which mutual advantage is achieved on the basis of the
international division of labor through the growth of the G.N.P. of both parties. Id.;
Vaynshteyn and Takhnenko, "Kompensatsionnye soglasheniya i voprosy effektivnosti" (Com-
pensatory agreements and questions of effectiveness), 5 M.E.M.O. 101-02 (1974).
Proposed compensatory agreements are evaluated by a research institute and the Foreign
Trade Department of the Soviet central planning agency, Gosplan, to determine whether the
deal should be made. The proposal is tested in three ways: on a production model, on an
economic model, and sociopolitically. Vaynshteyn and Takhnenko, "Kompensatsionnye
soglashentya i voprosy effektivnosti" (Compensatory agreements and questions of effective-
ness), 5 M.E.M.O. 101-02 (1974). Approval allows one of two types of agreements to take
form. Either the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade or another agency, concludes the agreement
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this did not mean that the USSR wanted to gain "some special economic
advantages," in the words of one Soviet commentator.8 Rather, the com-
mentator continued, the Soviet Union decided to use Western capital in the
pipeline project "to aid the development of mutually beneficial cooperation
between the USSR and the Western countries."9 Another commentator
characterized international trade as "not only a good way of satisfying the
material interests of the participating sides, but, first and foremost, a pow-
erful factor in strengthening peace and good relations between states."' 0
Thus, there was a Soviet motive behind the more immediate desire for a
pipeline deal, but that motive was allegedly benevolent.
Other Soviet commentators elaborated on the connection between eco-
nomic cooperation and political ties in terms of the pipeline deal. One com-
mentator stated that the deal was concluded "to consolidate the climate of
trust in Europe," while at the same time to pave the way for expanding
East-West business cooperation." The deputy chairman of the Soviet state
planning commission, Gosplan, averred that "there was no need to prove
for the compensatory deal, or an all-union foreign trade association does so. Both types are
considered civil agreements, rather than agreements between nations. M. BOGUSLAVSKIY,
CHASTNOE MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO (Private international law) 201-02 (1982).
8. Prague Television Broadcast of July 15, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, July 16, 1982, at
CC2. In the Soviet view, such cooperation with the West allows the socialist states to more
quickly fulfill long-term economic plans, develop new areas of their countries, and broaden the
production capabilities in individual branches of industry. Shmelev, supra note 7, at 30. These
long-term economic ties are thought to provide the stability needed to meet the requirements
of socialist planned economies, which otherwise might be slowed by inefficient domestic pro-
duction. Shmidt, "Perspektivy ekonomicheskikh svyazey mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom"
(The future prospects for economic ties between the East and West), 10 M.E.M.O. 16 (1978).
Soviet economists do, however, admit that as the socialist countries become more and more
involved with the West they will have no choice but to take into account the uneven develop-
ment and structural problems of the world economy when they draw up their long-term plans.
Maksimova, "Vsemirnoe khozaystvo i mezhdunarodnoe ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo"
(World business and international economic cooperation), 4 M.E.M.O. 17 (1974).
9. Prague Television Broadcast, supra note 8.
10. Moscow Radio Broadcast of July 1, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, July 2, 1982, at G5.
Soviet economic theorists see the development of economic ties between the socialist and non-
socialist states as an inevitable historical tendency in world economics, part of the trend to-
wards an "international division of labor" touted by socialist doctrine. The division of labor is
considered inevitable because there are so many products that even the largest and most devel-
oped states cannot efficiently produce them all. The advantage of such a tendency, in the
socialist view, is that the resulting specialization will purportedly increase the productivity of
labor on an international scale. See Maksimova, supra note 8, Bogomolov, "Ekonomicheskie
svyazi mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i kapitalisticheskimi stranami" (Economic ties between so-
cialist and capitalist countries), 3 M.E.M.O. 41 (1980); Vaynshteyn & Takhnenko, supra
note 7, at 102. See generally Shmelev, supra note 7.
11. Novoe vremya, Sept. 3, 1982, at 1, reported in FBIS-SU, Sept. 15, 1982, at CC3.
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what effective factors of detente international trade and economic relations
are," and that "an orientation toward the long term in economic links is an
orientation toward peaceful coexistence."" Coming, as it did, from an offi-
cial of the governmental body responsible for drafting and monitoring eco-
nomic plans, the deputy chairman's affirmation of the pipeline deal was not
politically insignificant. Gosplan does not tolerate uncertainty in the execu-
tion of planned projects. The Soviet minister of the gas industry, who is
responsible, inter alia, for producing the gas to be exported on the gas pipe-
line under construction, bestowed his imprimatur on the deal, viewing it as
ideologically compatible with Soviet economic theory in its adherence to the
principle of the international division of labor.'3 By having these two gov-
ernment officials go on record as wholeheartedly endorsing the pipeline deal
with the West, to the extent of linking it to firmly-held Soviet political and
economic tenets, the Soviet government risked significant political fallout
had the sanctions been effective in diverting the West European states from
economic cooperation with the USSR.
The motives of the United States in instituting the sanctions were as-
sessed by some Soviet commentators as involving the desire to upset
detente.1' One commentator suggested that the United States was dissatis-
fied with cooperation between Western Europe and the USSR because such
cooperation stabilized the political situation in Europe and helped to
strengthen the sovereignty and independence of West European countries.Y
Another commentator evaluated the current U.S. administration as the
"destroyer of everything positive accumulated over the preceding period in
relations between states with different social systems."' 6 Then-President
Brezhnev was quoted as calling the policy of sanctions "an adventurist ap-
proach towards extremely serious problems affecting the fate of man-
kind."' 7 Another Soviet writer viewed the United States as a "destructive
12. Moscow Radio Broadcast of July 15, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, July 20, 1982, at
CC5.
13. Pravda, July 16, 1982, at 4, reported in FBIS-SU, July 20, 1982, at CC8.
14. The Soviets do not deny the primacy of politics in international cooperation between
socialist and capitalist states. Mutual economic dealings are thought to be the bellwether of
detente, and Soviet economists expect that "reactionary forces" will continue to try to limit
economic relations with socialist countries. Thus, the extent of East-West cooperation will de-
pend on the status of detente. See Shmidt, supra note 8, at 18; and Maksimova, supra note 8,
at 18.
15. Izvestiya, July 12, 1982, at 3, reported in FBIS-SU, July 20, 1982, at CC13.
16. 37 ZA RUBEZHOM 1 (1982), reported in FBIS-SU, Sept. 15, 1982, at CC2.
17. Id. The policy of sanctions and boycotts is condemned by Soviet writers. See BOGUS-
LAVSKIY, supra note 7, at 106; Rakhmaninov, "Evropa na otvetstvennom rubezhe" (Europe at
a crucial step), 8 M.E.M.O. 8 (1982). The Soviets have supported the inclusion of a clause in
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, to the effect that any
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force in international relations both politically and economically, [whose]
actions are leading to the destruction of the international division of la-
bor.""8 The sanctions, then, came to represent a manifestation of U.S. hos-
tility towards detente and towards all the benefits the USSR and, in the
Soviet view, the world enjoyed because of detente. The U.S. sanctions were
also said to violate the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe, the Helsinki accords,19 specifically the respect for sover-
eignty, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, and the develop-
ment of economic cooperation between states.2 0 In commemoration of the
seventh anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, August 1, 1982, several
Soviet commentators itemized the agreements signed at Helsinki that were
subsequently breached by the United States, the most obvious manifesta-
tion of which was the pipeline embargo."1 It was noted that the West Euro-
pean and socialist countries were conscientiously implementing the Helsinki
agreement that trade would be expanded "on the broadest possible multilat-
eral plane." 2 The agreement also indicated specifically that energy re-
sources, such as oil, gas and coal, were suitable spheres for increasing long
term economic cooperation. By analyzing the U.S. sanctions in the context
of the Helsinki accords, the Soviet commentators were attempting to blunt
U.S. claims of Soviet Helsinki violations, as well as characterize the sanc-
state putting economic pressure on another state to restrict the exercise of its sovereign rights
would be in violation of the U.N. Charter. Lobanov, "Kodeks ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy"
(Code of economic relations), 6 M.E.M.O. 116 (1975).
In addition, it is argued that discrimination in international economic relations on the
basis of economic, political, and social systemic differences may also be a violation of the
principle of noninterference. This is true whether the discrimination is direct or indirect, in the
internal or foreign affairs of a State. See G. TUNKIN, MEZHFUNSTOFNOR PRAVO (International
Law) 119 (1982).
18. TASS Wire Service of Sept. 23, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, Sept. 29, 1982, at
CC13.
19. 14 I.L.M. 1293 (1975); 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975). The Helsinki accords
called for efforts to develop cooperation in economics, science and technology and the environ-
ment to strengthen peace and security in Europe. Thirty-three European countries, the U.S.
and Canada signed the accords. Soviet writers stress that the Helsinki accords represented a
long-term program for cooperation among the signatory states and that long-term economic
agreements were signed with Western states in that spirit. See G. TUNKIN, supra note 17, at
383; Rakhmaninov, supra note 17, at 8.
20. Rakhmaninov, supra note 17.
21. Moscow Radio Broadcast of July 29, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, July 30, 1982, at
CC5. Selskaya zhizn, Aug. 1, 1982, at 3, reported in FBIS-SU, Aug. 6, 1982, at CC3.
In addition, the Helsinki Final Act itself called for the development of new sources of
energy and of new technology for the transmission and distribution of energy, as the Soviets
were quick to point out. Shmidt, supra note 8, at 12.
22. Selskaya zhizn, supra note 21, at CC4.
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tions as an anti-European maneuver.
Many Soviet commentators, in fact, reported that the U.S. embargo
was indicative of U.S.-West European economic and political conflict, and
was an attempt by the U.S. to regain superiority over Western Europe. 8
The political superiority would allegedly be achieved by destroying detente
and forcing the West European allies to adhere to strict discipline within
the NATO alliance.24 It was for this reason, according to the Soviet view,
that the U.S. administration was also scaring and intimidating Western Eu-
rope with the Soviet "threat".2 5 More importantly, though, the commenta-
tors saw the embargo as an attempt by the United States to weaken the
economies of West European states and thereby remove the latter's indus-
tries as the chief competitors of U.S. firms."' According to one Soviet econ-
omist, the U.S. sanctions were part of a three-year trend of inter-capitalist
economic warfare.27 In his view, a successful U.S. embargo would deprive
the West European states of "lucrative and capacious commodity markets"
in the Soviet bloc, and would "restore U.S. leadership in economic rela-
tions" with Western Europe. Further, the economist analyzed U.S. de-
mands on NATO members to increase their military appropriations as an-
other facet of the U.S. effort to weaken the economic positions of its
business rivals.
The embargo was also viewed by the Soviets as an attempt by the
United States to achieve hegemony in international energy for the non-so-
cialist world. 8 Proof of this, in the opinion of one commentator, was the
fact that the U.S. oil industry occupied a major position in the West Euro-
23. Lukov & Zagorskiy, supra note 6. TASS Wire Service of Oct. 4, 1982, reported in
FBIS-SU, Oct. 5, 1982, at A2. Literaturnaya gazeta, July 7, 1982, at 9, reported in FBIS-SU,
July 20, 1982, at CCL. Novoe vremya, Sept. 3, 1982, at 1, reported in FBIS-SU, Sept. 15,
1982, at CC3. Izvestiya, Nov. 29, 1982, at 3, reported in FBIS-SU, Nov. 30, 1982, at CCI.
See also Noskova, "Zapadnaya Evropa i SSHA: Narastanie sopernichesiva" (Western Eu-
rope and the U.S.A.: The growth of rivalry), 8 M.E.M.O. 112 (1980).
Whether this analysis is persuasive or not, some independent facts indicate the United
States found the Western European credit terms to the Soviet Union unpalatably suggestive of
Western subsidization of socialism. See Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1982, at Al. This was especially
irksome as the terms were arguably favorable in relation to world rates. In response, the Sovi-
ets argue that these credit rates should not be pegged to world rates since "each long-term
program has its own individual characteristics." Vaynshteyn & Takhnenko, supra note 7, at
101. In the pipeline agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, the
low rates were offset by lower Soviet gas prices and higher German construction supply prices.
Wash. Post, July 28, 1982, at A16.
24. TASS Wire Service of July 15, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, July 15, 1982, at CCI.
25. Izvestiya, Nov. 29, 1982, at 3, reported in FBIS-SU, Nov. 30, 1982, at CC4.
26. TASS Wire Service, supra note 24. Moscow Radio Broadcast, supra note 10.
27. TASS Wire Service of Oct. 4, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, Oct. 5, 1982, at A2.
28. Lukov & Zagorskiy, supra note 6, at 105.
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pean economy, and would apparently lose its influence with the increased
supply of Soviet natural gas into Europe.19 Ultimately, in another commen-
tator's view, the U.S. goal was to establish control over oil resources in the
Middle East and Persian Gulf and then dictate its political will to Western
Europe. 0 Another Soviet commentator, appearing in an article in an Aus-
trian newspaper, claimed that the U.S. administration's desire to substan-
tially expand the sales market for U.S. coal in Western Europe was an
important motive behind the embargo.81
Whether or not such anti-U.S. arguments were persuasive to the West
Europeans, who were the ultimate, if not the designated, audience for much
of the above-mentioned commentary, is hard to determine. The reason for
the West European states' refusal to support the U.S. sanctions was proba-
bly less out of political or economic mistrust of U.S. motives, although the
attempt to apply U.S. law extraterritorially did rankle those states, than out
of their own political and economic situations. One Soviet commentator
noted that "the stability and dynamic nature of the Soviet economy" makes
the Soviet Union an attractive trade and economic power, particularly now
that the world capitalist economy is experiencing an economic slump, with
unemployment and unused production capabilities.82 The "stability and dy-
namic nature" of the Soviet economy, seemingly a contradiction in terms, is
hardly an accurate characterization of that economy, and is even less accu-
rate as an economic incentive for Soviet-West European trade. The latter
part of the commentator's statement, concerning the European economic
slump, touches on probably the main reason for West European-USSR
economic fidelity, occasional and even sincere interests in detente on the
part of the West European states notwithstanding.
Several Soviet commentators claimed that the USSR would fulfill its
obligations to deliver gas to its West European customers whether or not
the U.S. sanctions prevented the delivery of pipeline equipment from the
West, primarily by domestic production of the needed equipment.8 3 A le-
29. Id.
30. Literaturnaya gazeta, supra note 23.
31. Arbeiter-Zeitung, June 29, 1982, at 4, reported in FBIS-SU, July 2. 1982, at G5.
32. Moscow Raidio Broadcast, supra note 10.
33. Moscow Radio Broadcast, supra note 12. Moscow Radio Broadcast of July 12, 1982,
reported in FBIS-SU, July 13, 1982, at CC5. TASS Wire Service of July 8, 1982, reported in
FBIS-SU, July 9, 1982, at CC2.
Apart from representing a reaction to the particular situation, this claim may also reflect
the Soviet legal framework. Under Soviet law, concluded contracts are to be strictly executed
(Article 169), and a unilateral refusal to fulfill an obligation or a unilateral change in the
conditions of a contract are not allowed except in circumstances provided for by law. V.
SMIRNOV, SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO (Soviet Civil Law) 339 (1982).
Foreign businessmen trading with the Soviets have indicated that the Soviets are cx-
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gaily-binding resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the So-
viet Communist Party and the USSR Council of Ministers on July 8, 1982,
which stated that the Soviet organizations working on the pipeline would
finish the project on time. ' Those organizations had also assumed legally-
binding obligations which were said to be "taken into account in the opera-
tional planning of Gosplan." 8 The general director of the Soviet gas export
authority Soyuzgazeksport indicated that, as a result of the Central Com-
mittee-Council of Ministers resolution, "the Soviet Union is offering firm
guarantees to its business partners that, despite the U.S. embargo and the
problem it creates, the gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe will be
completed on time.""0 The resolution also stipulated that the gas exports
would be supplied in accordance with the contracts concluded with the
West European firms." Whether the resolution opened up the possibility
that the Soviet gas export organization could be held contractually liable
for nonperformance by the West European firms is unclear," but the
USSR held itself up to potential international ridicule, as well as confirma-
tremely performance-minded, and that they expect foreign parties to be as committed to per-
formance. J. GIFFEN, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WII THE SOVIET UNION
163 (1969).
For the Soviet firm that implements a compensatory agreement, Soviet law stipulates that
the obligation must be performed even after the payment of fines for nonperformance. V.
SMIRNOV, at 351-52. The obligation attaches despite the fact that usually the Soviet firms are
not under formal contract; rather, the obligation is established directly by planning documents.
(Article 159). Id. at 325. Only if these documents are revoked or modified or the performance
completed does the obligation cease. Id. at 340.
34. Pravda, July 8, 1982, at 1. The resolution was not published in its full text in Soviet
newspapers, nor did it appear at all in the official compilation of government and Party resolu-
tions, Sobranie postanovieniy pravitel'stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik
(Collection of the Resolutions of the Government of the USSR).
35. Moscow Radio Broadcast, supra note 12, at CC6. The obligation of the Soviet organi-
zations is established directly by planning documents, and does not need to be formalized by
contract. The obligation ceases only if the planning documents are revoked or modified or if
the performance is completed. The Soviet economic system does not favor the payment of
compensation instead of the promised goods or services, as the obligation was carefully
planned by Gosplan within a system of closely intertwined obligations. See V. SMIRNOV,
SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO (Soviet Civil Law) 324 et seq. (1982).
36. Moscow Radio Broadcast of Aug. 25, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, Aug. 26, 1982, at
CC8.
37. See Prague Television Broadcast, supra note 8.
38. Compensatory agreements are governed by civil law (private international law), de-
spite the fact that these agreements are closely tied to inter-governmental agreements on trade.
BoGUSLAVSKIY, supra note 7, at 201.
The remedies provided by Soviet law for nonperformance include recoupment of losses
(anticipatory and planned profits) and the payment of fines. SMIRNOV, supra note 33, at 364-
66.
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tion of U.S. allegations of Soviet technological inferiority, if it failed to
finish the project on time, probably a more egregious penalty for the Soviet
leadership than monetary damages.
The Soviet record on contract performance, particularly for gas ship-
ments, was described as exemplary by one Soviet commentator. According
to his figures, the USSR had never suspended gas deliveries to West Euro-
pean customers in the thirteen years it had been a supplier.8 9 Another com-
mentator warned that the USSR, in turn, expected the West Europeans to
honor their obligations to the Soviet Union, particularly because trade in
gas "naturally demands certain economic and political guarantees" for the
exporting country. 0 He stated that the USSR cannot assume the burden of
such an expenditure of resources "without firm confidence in the stability of
contracts signed." 1 Even prior to the U.S. sanctions, one Soviet commenta-
tor stated that the gas importers were expected to take upon themselves an
equal degree of responsibility to realize the construction projects supporting
the gas delivery.4 2 In fact, under the "gas-for-pipes" deal these responsibili-
ties were assumed not only by Soviet and West European firms but also by
their respective governments, which provided an additional degree of assur-
ance that the contracts would be performed."3 Thus, the commentators'
warnings were hortatory at best.
The lifting of the U.S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union, which
occurred while the pipeline sanctions were still in effect, was considered by
Soviet commentators to be an admission that economic sanctions against
the USSR were not effective.44 Neither this, however, nor the subsequent
39. TASS Wire Service of Aug. 25, 1982, reported in FBIS-SU, Aug. 26, 1982, at CC7.
40. lzvestiya, supra note 15.
41. id.
42. Mangushev, "Problemy evropeyskogo rynka gaza" (Problems of the European Gas
Market), 8 M.E.M.O. 39, 47 (1981).
43. The compensatory agreement is based ultimately on inter-governmental relations. In
most cases, the binding effect of the compensatory agreement is conditioned on approval by the
respective governments and the compensatory agreement is itself usually subsumed in an inter-
governmental agreement on trade. This intertwining of private and state agreements is claimed
by the Soviets to be a "new international mechanism for economic relations," based on the
socialist model, that the capitalist states are forced to accept as the only acceptable, legal basis
for mutual relations. Whether or not this "new mechanism" is ideologically sound from the
Soviet perspective, the inter-governmental aspect of the compensatory agreement provides a
major incentive for the complete performance of the contract, and it explains why interference
on the part of other states in the performance of those agreements affects the interests of the
state directly. See Maksimova, supra note 8, at 15-16, BOGUStAVSKIY, supra note 7, at 203.
44. Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1982, at A16, col. 1. The U.S. has been active in instituting
discriminatory measures with the USSR particularly since the 1950's. See BOGUSLAVSKIY,
supra note 7, at 99-102. One Soviet economist has noted that by the mid-1950's the European
allies of the U.S. had already begun to realize the limitations of embargoes against the East
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lifting of the pipeline embargo on November 13, 1982, changed the Soviet
assessment of the United States as a trading partner.45 Several Soviet com-
mentators during the embargo had indicated that the United States lacked
stability and continuity and that each new U.S. administration embarked
on costly experiments damaging to both U.S. companies and international
trade as a whole.' 6 Several days after Reagan announced his decision to end
the sanctions, 250 U.S. businessmen attended a meeting of the U.S.-USSR
Trade and Economic Council in Moscow. The U.S. businessmen were told
by the Soviet foreign trade minister that trade could develop between the
two countries only if the United States "once and for all" renounced the use
of trade "as a weapon against our country.' 47 Without such measures to
generate confidence, he alleged, there would be no deals. The Soviet prime
minister spoke at the same meeting, and indicated that the USSR was in
fact ready for a more constructive relationship with the United States.48
Since that meeting, however, there have been few confidence-building
measures emanating from the United States. In fact, Reagan claimed that,
in lifting the embargo, he was doing so because it had achieved its purpose
of demonstrating to the Soviet Union that "their policies of oppression
would entail substantial costs.' 4 This comment was hardly a renunciation
of the use of trade as a political weapon, and could not have been perceived
by the USSR as an encouraging move on the part of the U.S. administra-
tion towards increased U.S.-Soviet trade.
There were some indications during the pipeline embargo that sug-
gested the Soviets may have been re-evaluating East-West trade and their
reliance on foreign goods. These published comments may reflect the real
lesson learned by the Soviet Union from the U.S. sanctions, the apparent
victory of the USSR in overcoming the U.S. actions notwithstanding. The
most prominent of these re-evaluations was an interview with the director of
the Soviet Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, O.T.
Bogomolov5 0 In that interview, Bogomolov pointed out that the socialist
and were beginning to search for markets there. Shmelev, "Novye gorizonty ekonomicheskikh
svyazey" (New horizons for economic ties) 1 M.E.M.O. 7 (1973).
45. Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1982, at Al, col. 4. TASS Wire Service of Nov. 17, 1982,
reported in FBIS-SU, Nov. 18, 1982, at CC5.
46. TASS Wire Service, supra note 39. Moscow Radio Broadcast of July 17, 1982, re-
ported in FBIS-SU, July 20, 1982, at CC13. The U.S. sanctions were additionally viewed as
leading to fundamental problems in the capitalist economy itself. Moscow Radio Broadcast,
supra note 10.
47. Wash. Post, supra note 43, at A24, col. 1.
48. Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1982, at A25, col. 5.
49. Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
50. Trud, July 3, 1982, at 3, reported in FBIS-SU, July 15, 1982, at CC3.
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states had at times unjustifiably inhibited their own research and develop-
ment in certain fields by simply importing new technology from the West.
As Bogomolov contended, rarely is the latest or best technology sold to so-
cialist countries, so that by the time it is assimilated it is obsolete. A further
complication identified by Bogomolov was the need by the socialist coun-
tries to constantly import spare parts for the Western purchases, requiring
hard currency and thereby burdening the country's balance of payments.
Bogomolov's solution was that the socialist countries ought not acquire
expensive Western technology that could be obtained in other socialist
countries or could be developed through joint efforts. He called on the coun-
tries to "strengthen their technical-economic and technological indepen-
dence," 5 1 while at the same time to "rationalize" their technological ties
with the West. 5 Specifically, Bogomolov saw the latter strategy as directed
towards buying more components and technology in support of domestic-
ally-produced equipment, rather than buying the finished equipment itself.
He also indicated that licenses should be purchased only in those areas
where the research base is sufficient to further improve the acquired
technology.58
It is not clear whether Bogomolov's view has high governmental ap-
proval, or whether he is simply exhibiting an institutional bias. It is signifi-
cant, though, that he was permitted to raise these issues when he did, de-
spite the apparently calm official analyses of the U.S. sanctions that seemed
to call for no major changes in East-West trade on the part of the USSR. It
may be, moreover, that his view is the true Soviet assessment of the future
of world economic integration, particularly with the apparent weakening of
detente among the Western states.
III. CONCLUSION
Soviet trade with Western Europe is unlikely to change immediately as
the result of the U.S. pipeline embargo. In the absence of a clear consensus
on the Soviet "threat" by the West European states, the United States will
probably remain unable to implement effective economic sanctions against
the USSR. Such a consensus seems unlikely, moreover, unless the Soviets
do something particularly heinous to a matter of European concern. As long
as Western Europe has a need for raw materials and energy, the USSR can
expect reasonably firm economic ties with those countries.
It is much less certain, though, whether the USSR will want to main-
51. Id., at CC4.
52. Id., at CC5.
53. Id., at CC6.
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lain the same level of trade with the West in the long term. Despite the
guarantees provided by inter-governmental agreements and, more funda-
mentally, by the economic realities faced by a resources-poor Europe, trade
with the West cannot be relied upon by the USSR, as the U.S. sanctions
showed in their intent if not in their impact. It would be grossly negligent of
Soviet planners if they were not making contigency plans to withdraw into
the socialist community for a greater part of Soviet foreign trade. Whether
this were done because of a failure of detente, or because of a desire to
develop domestic technologies, the economic and political repercussions
would probably be greater for Western Europe than for the United States.
Thus, the U.S. sanctions, and other such future U.S. economic actions vis-
a-vis the USSR, may eventually force the separation of Western Europe
and the Soviet Union, but the separation may be at the Soviets' initiative,
and on Soviet terms.
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